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The domestic politics of the transatlantic GMO dispute1 
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When the transatlantic trade dispute over genetically modified organisms came to a 
boil in the late 1990s and early 2000s it was widely expected to be highly conflictual.  
The United States was, almost universally, expected to challenge fundamentally the 
European Union’s regulatory system for GMOs before the World Trade Organisation 
and was equally universally expected to win the case.  The EU was widely, albeit not 
universally, expected to refuse to comply with the ruling.  In keeping with most of the 
international political economy literature on trade disputes, both of these expectations 
were rooted in assessments of societal demands for action and resistance.  Both 
expectations, however, were confounded; the US (and its co-complainants) filed a 
narrow challenge focusing on the EU’s failure to apply its own procedures; and the 
EU, somewhat falteringly, has resumed approvals of GMOs.  Applying a two-level-
game framework, this article argues that this relatively cooperative outcome is 
explained by the executives of both polities exercising their autonomy to pursue 
policies closer to the preferences of the other polity than their median domestic 
constituents would have preferred.  This article, therefore, makes the case for taking 
government preferences and autonomy seriously when analysing the outcomes of 
trade disputes.  Moreover, it emphasises that compliance with international rules 
engages with on-going internal policy processes and debates. 
 
 
 
In November 2006 the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body 
ruled largely in favour of the United States, along with Argentina and Canada, in its 
complaint against the European Union’s non-approval of genetically modified (GM) 
crops and the bans that some of its member states maintained on EU-approved GM 
crops.  When the dispute ignited in the late 1990s, there were wide-spread 
expectations that the US would pursue the EU’s rules on agricultural biotechnology 
aggressively; that the WTO would rule in favour of the US; and that the EU would 
refuse to change its behaviour, provoking a nasty trade dispute and prompting 
questions about the efficacy of WTO rules.  Contrary to these expectations, the US 
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engaged in extensive negotiations to resolve the dispute before initiating a narrow 
challenge to the EU’s procedures.  In the wake of the ruling, which neither side 
appealed, the EU resumed approvals of GM crops and pressed the member states to 
lift their bans.  These policy changes were sufficient to placate the Canadian and 
Argentine governments, which settled their disputes with the EU in July 2009 and 
March 2010 respectively.   
The anticipated tumultuous trajectory of the dispute reflected common 
understandings about the politics of trade disputes, which focus on societal pressures 
for action.  The expectation that the US would challenge the EU’s regulations 
aggressively reflected the preferences of politically influential groups in the US – the 
biotechnology industry and farmers – and their considerable support in Congress.  The 
expectation that EU policy would not change, even if sanctions were imposed, 
reflected both the extent of popular hostility to GM crops and the EU’s 
‘hyperconsensual’ decision-rules. The relatively cooperative outcome, therefore, 
confounds contemporaneous expectations reflecting common understandings of the 
politics of trade disputes and thus poses a puzzle. 
This article advances an explanation rooted in Robert Putnam’s (1988) two-
level game metaphor.  It argues that the two executives – the US administration and 
the European Commission – had substantive preferences closer to those of the other 
polities than were the median preferences within their own polity; that each executive 
was a ‘dove.’  Moreover, under existing domestic institutions each executive had 
considerable, but not unlimited, scope to pursue its preferences.  The contours of the 
dispute, therefore, reflect the interaction of the two executives’ pursuits of their 
preferences within existing constraints.  This argument is based on more than twenty 
not-for-attribution interviews with US government and European Commission 
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officials and representatives of business associations and consumer and environmental 
groups on both sides of the Atlantic at intervals between 2001 and 2010 and extensive 
primary documents.  This article, therefore, underlines the importance of taking the 
executive preferences seriously and contributes to debates in international political 
economy about decisions to initiate trade disputes and the domestic politics of 
compliance.   
The article begins by describing the substance of the dispute, identifying the 
expectations common at the outset of the dispute about how it would develop, and 
contrasting these with what happened.  Drawing on this, it highlights the 
shortcomings of the prevailing accounts of trade disputes and advances a two-level 
game framework for analysis.  It then applies this framework to explain the details of 
how the dispute developed.  The article concludes by exploring the implications for 
our understanding of the political dynamics of trade disputes and for the analysis of 
compliance. 
 
Regulatory differences and the origins of the GMO dispute  
The regulatory differences that underpin the transatlantic dispute over GMOs have 
received considerable attention elsewhere (see, for example, Bernauer 2003; Pollack 
and Shaffer 2009), and I will rehearse them only briefly here.  The EU’s approach to 
approving GM crops differs in three fundamental ways from the US system.  First, 
GM crops are treated as inherently different from those produced via other means.  
Second, the European approval process provides much greater scope for the 
consideration of non-scientific factors.  Third, there are many more veto points in the 
approval process.  In particular, the risk management decision is explicitly separate 
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from risk assessment and is subject to a vote by the member states.  Moreover, GM 
crops in the EU must be traceable and labelled as GM.  
The approval of GM crops in the EU is governed by two rules: Directive 
2001/18 (which replaced Directive 90/220 in 2001), regulating cultivation; and 
Regulation 1829/2003 (which replaced Regulation 258/97 in 2003), governing to GM 
food and feed.  Although there differences in how the approval process begins under 
these rules, thereafter it proceeds in broadly the same way.  On the basis of a scientific 
assessment both of safety and likely environmental impact by the European Food 
Safety Agency (EFSA), the Commission decides whether to propose approval of the 
product.  If it does, the proposal is discussed by member state officials in the Standing 
Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health (SCoFCAH), which can approve or 
reject the product by a qualified majority vote (a supermajority).  If SCoFCAH does 
not approve the product, the proposal goes to the Council of Ministers, again 
representing the member states, but at ministerial level, which also requires a 
qualified majority to approve the product.  Crucially for this analysis, if the Council 
does not approve the crop or reject it (also by a qualified majority vote), the proposal 
authorising the GMO ‘shall be adopted by the Commission’ (Decision 1999/468/EC, 
Article 5).   
There are, however important differences, as will become apparent, between 
the two types of approvals in terms of which part of the Commission takes the lead 
and which national ministers take decisions.  The European Commission is (since 
2007) made up of 27 commissioners (ministers), who take decisions collectively in 
the ‘college,’ by a simple majority vote if necessary.  Decisions may also be delegated 
to sub-groups of commissioners.  The president of the Commission is chosen by the 
leaders of the EU’s member states meeting as the European Council.  Each member 
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state nominates a commissioner and they are endorsed by the European Council and 
approved by the European Parliament. The Commission has a five-year term.  The 
core of the story here takes place during the first ‘Barroso’ (after the president) 
Commission (2004-09), which ended up serving a care-taker role until February 2010.  
The commissioners are supported by a permanent civil service divided into 
directorates general, the equivalent of ministries.  Approvals of GM food and feed, 
submitted under Regulation 1829/2003, are dealt with by the Directorate General for 
Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) and the Commissioner for health.  Approvals 
for cultivation were until February 2010 dealt with by the Environment Directorate 
General and the Commissioner for the environment.  The DG is responsible for 
advancing a proposal for adoption and chairs the meeting of the SCoFCAH.  Should 
SCoFCAH not approve the product, the college of Commissioners formally adopts a 
proposal for the Council to consider.  Approvals for food and feed are normally 
considered by the Council of Ministers in the ‘configuration’ of ministers of 
agriculture, those for cultivation are normally considered by environment ministers.  
As will be discussed below, these differences contributed to the different degrees of 
change in the EU’s approvals for marketing and cultivation. 
As only approved varieties of GM crops can be grown or sold in a polity, 
differences in the EU and US approval processes, with the EU taking longer to reach 
decisions, posed problems from the outset.  The potential adverse trade effects of the 
different approval processes were greatly exacerbated by the EU’s suspension of 
approvals from October 1998 in part in response to a number of high-profile food 
safety scandals that had decimated public trust in European regulatory processes 
(Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Vogel 2003: 572-3).  In June 1999 the governments of five 
member states -- Denmark, Greece, France, Italy and Luxembourg -- announced a de 
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facto moratorium on approvals pending the adoption of an enhanced regulatory 
framework (Council 1999), which was adopted as Directive 2001/18 and Regulation 
1829/2003 (mentioned above).  The adverse trade effects of the EU’s approval 
process were compounded during 1997-2001 by six EU member states – Austria, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Luxembourg – adopting, under safeguard clauses 
in the EU’s rules, national bans on varieties of GM corn and oilseed rape that had 
been approved by the EU.   
During 1995 US biotechnology companies began to complain to the US 
government about the EU’s ‘unpredictable, cumbersome and non-transparent’ 
approval process (USTR 1996: 98).  Business complaints to the US government about 
the ‘politicisation’ of the approval process intensified during 1996 and 1997 (USTR 
1997: 99; 1998: 103).  These concerns came to a boil with the announcement of the de 
facto moratorium in 1999.  Initially, however, there was only muted business pressure 
for a WTO complaint.  Although biotechnology companies were feeling the pinch, the 
impact on others in the US was limited to corn farmers, and their exports to the EU 
were relatively small (Young 2001).  As the EU’s moratorium dragged on, however, 
the continued commercialization of new genetically modified varieties in the US 
meant that more and more crops could not be exported to the EU.  Difficulties in 
keeping non-EU-approved GM varieties separate from the rest of a crop decreased 
demand for new varieties in the US (Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Young 2003).  In 
addition, other countries were reluctant to grow or even import GM varieties that had 
not been approved in the EU for fear that their exports to the EU would be blocked, 
which magnified the commercial consequences of the EU’s practices (Bernauer 2003; 
Devereaux et al 2006; Pollack and Shaffer 2009). 
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Confounded expectation I: Aggressive US 
Political pressure for action was, therefore, mounting as the Bush administration came 
into office in 2001. The biotechnology industry (Bio 2003) and major agricultural 
lobbies – including the American Farm Bureau Federation (Stallman 2003); the 
American Soybean Association (Joachim 2003); and the National Corn Growers 
Association and the US Grains Council (Yoder and Jacoby 2003) – in testimony 
before Congress and in letters to the president expressed their objections to the role of 
politics in the EU’s approval process, which they thought violated WTO law (IATP 
2002).2  These objections and the assessment of WTO incompatibility were echoed in 
Congress (see, for example, Baucus 2003; Grassley 2003; Hastert 2003), and groups 
of leading Congressmen wrote to the President demanding that a WTO complaint be 
brought (see, for example, Harkin, Grassley and Baucus 2002; Hastert, Blunt, 
Goodlatte, Pombo, Gutknecht, Hayes, Jenkins, Lucas, Moran and Wolf 2003).  Thus 
there was significant and increasing pressure from powerful domestic interest groups 
(Bernauer 2003: 165) and Congress for the administration to challenge the EU’s 
regulatory framework for GMOs. 
As the US government is generally considered to be highly responsive to 
business concerns about foreign trade barriers and aggressive in pursuing them (see 
Bhagwati 1990; Ostry quoted in The Economist, 8 May 1999: 17; Porter 2005: 205; 
Shaffer 2003; Zeng 2002), there was a widespread expectation among activists and 
academics that mounting producer and Congressional pressure would lead to a broad 
and fundamental challenge the EU’s regulatory framework for GMOs (Amicus 
Coalition 2004; Bernauer 2003: 167; Greenpeace 2003; Guzman 2004-5: 32; 
Wilkinson 2002: 136).   
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The expectation that the US would aggressively challenge the EU regulatory 
approach, however, proved false.  When filing the complaint in May 2003 the US 
(and its co-complainants) did not challenge the EU’s rules for approving GM crops, 
rather it challenged the EU’s general moratorium; the absence of product-specific 
approvals; and the member states’ bans.  Specifically, the US complaint argued: 
While [WTO] Members are allowed to maintain approval systems – 
and the United States is not objecting to the EC maintaining such a 
system for biotech products – the procedures under that system must be 
undertaken and completed “without undue delay.” It is hard to think of 
a situation that involves “undue delay” more than a complete 
moratorium on approvals. In this case, the EC can present no scientific 
basis for a moratorium on biotech approvals. In fact, many of the 
products caught up in the EC moratorium have been positively assessed 
by the EC’s own scientific committees. In short, having established a 
biotech approval regime, the EC is obligated to apply those procedures 
fairly and transparently, and without undue delay.  
 
In addition to the moratorium on the approval of new biotech products, 
six EC member States have adopted marketing or import bans on 
biotech products that previously have been approved by the EC. These 
product-specific bans, like the moratorium, are not based on science 
and are thus inconsistent with the EC’s obligations under the WTO 
Agreement. (USTR 2004: 1) 
 
The US summarised its complaint thus ‘In challenging the EC’s moratorium … the 
United States is simply calling on the EC to allow its own approval procedures to run 
their course.’ (USTR 2004: 1)  Further, through March 2010 the US has not initiated a 
complaint against the EU’s traceability and labelling requirements.  Thus the 
complaint filed was far narrower than that demanded by societal actors and 
anticipated by commentators. 
The WTO panel ruled on the dispute in September 2006, and its decision was 
formally adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body in November 2006 (WTO 2006; for 
a discussion see Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 187-99).  The panel found that the EU’s 
moratorium on approvals was incompatible with the EU’s WTO obligations, but only 
because it constituted an ‘undue delay.’  The panel also found that the member state’s 
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bans violated the agreement because they were not ‘based on’ a risk assessment.  
Notably, neither the Commission nor the Bush administration appealed the panel’s 
ruling. 
 
Confounded expectation II: Resistant EU  
When the dispute was fermenting the general expectation was that the EU would be 
unlikely to change its policies in response to the anticipated adverse WTO ruling 
(Bernauer 2003: 165; Busch and Howse 2003: 7-8; Devereaux et al 2006; Moore and 
Winham 2002: 13; Pollack 2003: 77; Taylor 2007: 433; Winham 2009: 412).  This 
expectation at least implicitly reflected the expectation that the US would challenge 
fundamentally the EU’s approval procedures, which would mean that compliance 
would entail legislative change, requiring the support of a qualified majority of the 
Council of Ministers and an absolute majority of the members of the European 
Parliament.  Given the wide-spread hostility to GMOs among European publics and 
the political sensitivity of the regulation of food-safety in the EU at the time there was 
no expectation that there would be sufficient support to reform the EU’s rules.  The 
expectation, therefore, was that the GMO dispute would be a re-run of the dispute 
over the EU’s ban on hormone treated beef in which the EU did not lift its ban 
(although it did modify its status) despite the imposition of sanctions by the US and 
Canada (Ames 2001: 214; Davis 2003: 317; Taylor 2007: 432; Winhan 2009: 409-
10). 
 Crucially, however, reflecting the narrow challenge, the ruling did not require 
legislative change.  Rather operating under its existing rules, the EU resumed 
approvals of GM varieties for food and feed; approving two varieties in 2004, one 
each in 2005 and 2006; six in 2007; four in 2008; five in 2009; and four through the 
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end of March 2010.  It also approved its first crop for cultivation since 1998 in March 
2010.  Efforts to remove member state bans, however, have been less successful.  
Most of the bans have lapsed because the varieties have been withdrawn by their 
producers and, under pressure from the Commission, Austria lifted its ban on the 
importation of GM maize varieties MON810 and T25.  Member state opposition, 
however, has blocked efforts to lift national bans on the cultivation of MON810, 
which have proliferated since 2004: Hungary (2005); France (2008); Germany (2009) 
and Luxembourg (2009).  In 2008 Austria also banned the sale of GM maize 
MON863 and four varieties of oilseed rape (Ms8, Rf3, Ms8xRf3, GT73).  Thus, while 
there has been policy change in the EU, the degree of change varies considerably 
across the different aspects of the policy.   
 
Bringing the COG back in 
As I shall develop below, the confounded expectations about how the transatlantic 
GMO dispute would develop reflected common pluralist, constituency-focused 
accounts of trade policy making and of compliance with international rules.  This 
article argues that the development of the dispute can be understood only if one pays 
due attention to the preferences and autonomy of the two executives; the ‘chiefs of 
government’ (COGs) in two-level game parlance.  This section describes the 
literatures in which expectations about the dispute were rooted and introduces the 
two-level game framework and how it applies to this dispute. 
 
The initiation of trade disputes as distributive politics 
The expectation that the US would prosecute the GMO dispute aggressively reflects 
common assumptions about the initiation of trade disputes.  Because the costs of 
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adjustment are expected to fall outside the polity, there are rarely domestic actors 
mobilised against initiating a trade dispute, although that may change when the 
imposition of sanctions is considered.  The initiation of trade dispute is characterised 
by ‘distributive politics’ (Bayard and Elliott 1994: 79; Grossman and Helpman 1995: 
705; Odell 1993: 233).  Therefore, while governments formally decide whether to 
pursue WTO complaints, they are generally considered unlikely to resist domestic 
demands for action (Alter 2003: 800; Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 10; Keohane, 
Moravcsik and Slaughter 2000: 486).   
According to this account of the initiation of trade disputes, the only reason for 
a cautious prosecution would be if there was a strong countervailing pressure, which 
was not evident in this case.  While there were US consumer and environmental 
groups that supported the EU’s GMO regime (see, for example, McGarity and 
Hansen, 2001; Hansen, 2000; Consumer Reports, September 1999),3 they were not 
considered to be very influential at the time (Lazarus, cited in Hammitt et al. 2005; 
Vig and Faure 2004, 7; Vogel 2003, 578).  In the absence of powerful societal 
pressure against initiating a complaint, the constituency approach to trade disputes 
cannot explain the narrowness of the US’s challenge to the EU’s GMO approval 
process. 
There is, however, an emerging literature that emphasizes that governments do 
not perceive initiating WTO complaints as costless (see Allee 2003; Bown 2005; 
Shaffer 2003; Sherman 2002).  In particular, initiating WTO disputes may harm 
important political relationships and winning them can create awkward precedents 
that constrain one’s own policy autonomy.  This article contributes to this literature by 
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illustrating the impact of such considerations and highlighting that such 
considerations may affect the substance of a complaint, not just whether there is one. 
 
Making concessions in response to mobilized interests 
The expectation that the EU would not change its GMO approval procedures in 
response to an adverse WTO ruling echoed the common assumptions in the literatures 
on trade disputes and compliance with international rules that concessions will be 
made only if a mobilized coalition of societal actors favouring change is more 
powerful than the coalition favouring the status quo (Bayard and Elliott 1994; 
Conybeare 1987; Dai 2005; 2006; Grossman and Helpman 1995; Gawande and 
Hansen 1999; Kahler 2000: 675; Schoppa 1993).  External pressure/international 
obligations is thought to change the preferences or level of engagement of actors 
already affected by the policy in question (Putnam 1988: 454) and/or causes actors not 
previously engaged with the specific policy to engage (Schoppa 1993: 372).  
Industries adversely affected by sanctions are typically depicted as the key actors 
advocating policy change (see, for example, Bayard and Elliott 1994; Conybeare 
1987; Odell 1993).  The central question is whether the political balance shifts 
sufficiently for policy change to occur, which has prompted some analyses to consider 
explicitly the impact of domestic decision rules (Dai 2006; Moravcsik 1993; Odell 
1993; Zeng 2002).   
According to this approach, the EU’s resumption of approvals in the wake of 
the adverse WTO ruling should have reflected the mobilization of a compliance 
coalition.  There was, however, only a limited mobilization by industry associations in 
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favour of the resumption of approvals for importation.4  Moreover, these actors – food 
and feed processors and livestock farmers -- were motivated not by concerns about 
sanctions but by the problems they were having sourcing sufficient non-GM or EU-
approved-GM animal feed (COCERAL, EuropaBio, FEFAC, FEDIOL 2007),5 and 
did not engage actively in the policy process until that problem became acute in 2007.  
Further, the EU’s member state governments, which in this regard act as a legislature, 
albeit one fully integrated into the regulatory decision making process, did not 
substantially change their positions on GM crops in the wake of the WTO ruling.6 
Consequently, during 2004-09 there was never a qualified majority of member states 
in favour of approving any GM variety and there were overwhelming majorities 
against requiring the lifting of member state bans on the cultivation of EU-approved 
GM crops. Thus the EU’s compliance with the WTO ruling, such as there has been, 
cannot be attributed to a shift in societal politics. 
This article argues that the crucial change was the willingness of the EU’s 
executive, the European Commission, which is more favourably disposed towards 
agricultural biotechnology than most member states, to exercise its authority to 
approve GM varieties.  Some of the two-level game literature on trade disputes 
acknowledges that executives may have preferences distinct from the sum of the 
specific pressures to which they are subjected (Conybeare 1987; Dai 2005; Grossman 
and Helpman 1995; Odell 1993: 258), but tends not to specify what the government’s 
substantive preferences are (Martin 2008).  This article underlines the importance of 
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6
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paying attention to the substantive preferences of the executive and to the scope of its 
policy autonomy. 
 
A two-level game framework 
Robert Putnam’s (1988) metaphor of the two-level game, capturing the interaction 
between international and domestic politics, is most commonly applied to 
international negotiations.  It has, however, been fruitfully applied to trade-disputes, 
in which one party is trying to change the behaviour of the other (Odell 1993; 
Schoppa 1993).  As Andrew Moravcsik (1993: 15) has pointed out, the two-level 
game approach emphasizes the ‘real initiative and discretion’ of the executive.  As the 
preceding discussion indicates, while some attention in the broader literature has been 
paid to the preferences of executives, the dominant approach is highly pluralist, and 
this pluralist emphasis contributed to the misguided expectations about the 
development of the transatlantic GMO dispute. 
 The two-level game metaphor draws attention to three key factors (Moravcsik 
1993: 23; Putnam 1988): the domestic ‘win set;’ the international environment; and 
the preferences of the executive.  The domestic ‘win set’ reflects the distribution of 
coalitions of preferences among societal actors and the decision rules that affect the 
adoption of policy.  This is very similar to the accounts of the domestic politics of 
trade disputes discussed above, although the two-level game metaphor draws 
particular attention to the scope for an executives to try to influence its domestic win 
set (e.g., through side-payments) or that of other party (e.g., through the threat or 
imposition of sanctions) (Putnam 1988: 450).  The legalistic nature of a WTO dispute 
reduces the analytical leverage of the international negotiating environment beyond 
the threat and imposition of sanctions, and the US had not pursued this strategy by the 
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time of writing (March 2010).  The most distinctive aspect of the two-level game 
approach for this article is its attention to the executives’ preferences and scope for 
autonomous action.   
The argument developed in the next section is that both the Bush 
Administration and the European Commission were ‘doves;’ the preferences of each 
were at least partially outside its own domestic win-set ‘in the direction of’ the other’s 
win-set, even though there is significant ‘distance’ between them (Moravcsik 1993: 
31).  As will be explained below, however, while the Commission overall was a 
‘dove,’ key actors within it were not.  This explains why approvals of GM varieties 
for food and feed resumed in 2004, but approvals for cultivation did not until 2010 
following a reform of responsibilities within the Commission.  Crucially, both 
executives had considerable scope to pursue their preferences within their respective 
‘win-sets;’ which Moravcsik (1993: 24) characterises as the ‘most fundamental way’ 
in which the executive can exercise influence (see also Odell 1993: 258).  The EU’s 
much smaller ‘win-set’ with respect to national bans compared to approvals explains 
much of the variance in the levels of compliance across the different aspects of the 
dispute. 
 
Executive autonomy the US’s narrow complaint 
The Bush administration pursued a much narrower challenge to the EU’s regulations 
than typically influential domestic political actors wanted, because its preferences 
were more moderate than those of the mobilised domestic actorse’.7  A particularly 
important consideration was a desire to preserve its own policy autonomy.  Because 
WTO rulings have the effect of establishing precedents, governments take care to 
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 Interviews, US government officials (Washington, DC, 8 and 11 Jan. 2001); European Commission 
officials (Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 2001; Brussels, 16 Sept. 2003). 
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avoid bringing complaints or deploying arguments that might apply to their own 
policies or practices (Bown 2005; Busch and Reinhardt 2002; Shaffer 2003).  
Avoiding inadvertently constraining US regulators was thus a consideration when 
deciding whether and how to bring the GM complaint (Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 
184).8  A second consideration would seem to have been preserving the transatlantic 
relationship.  Trade disputes, particularly those pursued through litigation rather than 
negotiation, are bad for amicable relations (Bown 2005).  The decision to postpone 
filing the compliant until after the completion of conventional military operations in 
Iraq (Baucus 2003: 4; Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 179), suggests concern for the 
foreign policy ramifications of filing a complaint.  The narrowness of the compliant, 
requiring only that the EU enforce its own rules, meant that it was less politically 
explosive than would have been one that threatened to require the EU to change 
popular policies for ensuring environmental protection and public health. 
The WTO’s rules facilitated the Bush administration’s exercise of autonomy 
by foreclosing unilateral action and delegating adjudication to a third party.  The 
establishment of the WTO and the introduction of binding dispute settlement curbed 
the unilateral imposition of trade sanctions to punish other countries’ policies, which 
had been a common US practice prior to the creation of the WTO (Bhagwatti 1990).  
Combined with third-party adjudication, this meant that rather than the Bush 
administration being the judge, deciding whether to punish the EU, it was the 
prosecutor, having to make the case to the WTO panel that the EU’s policy violated 
WTO law.  This made it easier for the administration to resist pressure to be more 
aggressive because the decision would reside with the panel.  Moreover, the initiation 
of a trade dispute does not require formal ratification, although domestic support 
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 Interviews, US government officials (Washington, DC, 11 Jan. 2001 and 14 Jan. 2005). 
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would be needed for the imposition of credible sanctions (Odell 1993: 237).  Thus, 
while the Bush administration might pay a political price for not acting, it did not 
need explicit approval for the action it took.  It therefore had considerable autonomy 
in deciding how to prosecute the WTO complaint. 
The necessity of persuading the WTO panel of the validity of the US’s 
complaint was also crucial to how it was pursued.  In particular, the complaint’s 
narrow focus reflected concerns about the likelihood of winning the case.  Although 
the WTO’s rules impose disciplines on regulatory decision-making, the case law of 
the WTO had significantly clarified the implications of these rules and had 
emphasised the discretion of national regulators (Pollack and Shaffer 2009: 184-7; 
Young and Holmes 2006: 293, 296-8).  Consequently, in the view of US trade 
officials the EU’s approval procedures, should they be applied, were compatible with 
WTO rules (USTR 2004: 1).9  Because the US government wanted to be confident of 
winning the complaint it concentrated on only those aspects of the EU’s approval 
process that it considered to be most clearly in violation of WTO rules.10  The WTO’s 
rules, therefore, delimited the grounds on which the US (and its co-complainants) 
could challenge the EUs’ measures.  
Despite dissatisfaction with slowness of the EU’s approval process (US 2010) 
and with the proliferation of member state bans (FAS 2009), the US has not moved to 
impose sanctions.  Following the expiration of an extended deadline for compliance 
(11 January 2008), the US submitted a request to the WTO for authorisation to impose 
sanctions.  It almost immediately suspended that request, however, while it and the 
EU sought to resolve the dispute.  Nonetheless, the US Trade Representative initiated 
a consultation process to identify what products might be included on a sanctions list 
                                                 
9
 Interview, US government official (Washington, DC, 14 Jan. 2005). 
10
 Interviews, US government officials (Washington, DC, 11 and 14 Jan. 2005). 
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should sanctions be authorised (USTR 2008: 4289). Although the US has been closely 
monitoring the EU’s approval process during 2009 and into 2010 it has not been 
actively threatened sanctions or published a list of targeted products, in part because 
the Obama administration has been considering how to proceed.11  In addition, as the 
EU has resumed approvals, it would harder to make the case to the WTO that the EU 
is not complying.12  The pressure from US farm interests for action has also eased, 
particularly because increased demand for soybeans in China has reduced the 
importance of the EU as an export market.13  Thus for a combination of reasons, 
neither the Bush nor the Obama administrations has actively sought to expand the 
EU’s ‘win-set’ by threatening credible sanctions. 
The US government did not pursue the EU’s regulatory framework nearly as 
aggressively as influential domestic actors wanted or as most activists and analysts 
had anticipated.  Both domestic and foreign policy considerations influenced its 
approach, as did the desire to construct a winning case.  The WTO framework, 
therefore, enhanced the administration’s autonomy, facilitating its adoption of a less 
aggressive approach than demanded by influential domestic actors. 
 
Varying executive preferences and autonomy and faltering EU policy changes 
As with the US administration, the European Commission’s position has been more 
conciliatory than that of most of the actors within the EU.  Crucially, the Commission 
has long been more favourably disposed towards agricultural biotechnology than most 
of the EU’s member states (Bernauer and Aerni 2008: 6; Commission 1998; 2002; 
                                                 
11
 Interview, US government official (Brussels, 24 Feb. 2010). 
12
 Interview, US government official (Brussels, 24 Feb. 2010). 
13
 Interviews, COPA-COGECA representative (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010); US government official 
(Brussels, 24 Feb. 2010). 
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FoEE 2007; Green 10 2009: 7; Pollack and Shaffer 2009; Tierberghien 2009: 395).14  
Commission President Manuel José Barroso, Trade Commissioner Peter Mandleson, 
Agriculture Commissioner Mariann Fischer Boel and Enterprise and Industry 
Commissioner Günter Verheugen, in particular, were favourably disposed towards 
agricultural biotechnology.15  Moreover, one of the Commission’s formal roles within 
the EU is the ‘guardian’ of the EU’s rules and there was a strong desire within the 
Commission to see the EU’s GMO procedures followed.16 
 Although collectively the Commission was relatively favourably disposed 
towards agricultural biotechnology, not all members of the Commission were.  DG 
SANCO and the Commissioner for Health Markos Kyprianou (2004-8) / Androulla 
Vassiliou (2008 – 10) were cautious about GM foods, but DG ENV and the 
Commissioner for the Environment (2004-09) Stavros Dimas had stronger misgivings 
about agricultural biotechnology (FAS 2007: 10; FoEE 2007: 2; Green 10 2009: 7).17 
This matters because, as discussed earlier, the DG and, particularly, the Commissioner 
responsible is the agenda setter, and Dimas used this role to impede approvals for 
cultivation.  Given the presence of multiple agenda setters within the Commission, the 
Commission might be usefully thought of as a composite COG. 
 
                                                 
14
 Interviews, Commission officials (San Domenico di Fiesole, 4 Dec. 2000; Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 
2001); US government officials (Washington, DC, 8 and 11 Jan. 2001, 11 Jan. 2005); representatives of 
the Biotechnology Industry Organization (Washington, DC, 9 Jan. 2001); European-American 
Business Council (Washington, DC, 8 Jan. 2001).  See also Assistant USTR (Agriculture) Jim 
Murphy’s testimony to the House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture’s Subcommittee on 
Risk Management, Research and Specialty Crops hearing on Agricultural Biotechnology, 3 March 
1999, p. 15. 
15
 Interview, Greenpeace representative (telephone, 2 Mar. 2010). 
16
 Interviews, Commission officials (Brussels, 23 Feb. 2010) 
17
 Interviews with European Commission officials (Brussels, 22, 23 and 24 Feb. 2010); representatives 
of COPA-COGECA (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010  ), European biotechnology industry (25 Feb. 2010), and 
Greenpeace (telephone, 2 Mar. 2010) 
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The resumption of approvals of GM varieties for food and feed 
The most marked change in the EU’s practices regarding GMOs has been the 
resumption of approval of GM crops for food and feed.  The Commission had 
undertaken to the US that it would resume approvals once the EU’s new regulatory 
framework was in place,18 and it did so in May 2004 just after the new framework was 
implemented and prior to the panel’s ruling.  As discussed earlier, however, the pace 
of approvals for food and feed, increased markedly after the WTO ruling. 
 In the wake of the WTO ruling the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade) 
and Trade Commissioner Mandelson (22 November 2004 – 3 October 2008) urged 
more rapid approvals of GM crops (Mandelson 2007: 2).19  While some efforts were 
made to persuade the member state governments to consider the implications of not 
complying with the WTO’s rulings, these seem to have had little effect as each of the 
23 votes on approvals for food and feed in SCoFCAH between 2004 and 2009 fell 
well short of a qualified majority.20  DG Trade’s main focus, therefore, was on 
expediting the Commission’s handling of approvals.21  This involved stressing the 
need for speed and lobbying for additional resources.  These efforts concentrated on 
the time that elapsed between the Commission receiving a positive opinion from 
EFSA and putting a draft decision to the SCoFCAH and following the (inevitable) 
                                                 
18
 Interviews, US government official (Washington, DC, 8 Jan. 2001) and Commission official 
(Washington, DC, 10 Jan. 2001). 
19
 Interviews, Commission officials (Brussels, 22 and 24 Feb. 2010) and representative of Greenpeace 
(telephone, 2 March 2010). 
20
 Details for the three votes prior to 2005 are not publically available.  For the three votes in 2005 
(when the EU had 25 member states) the voting intentions in the Council are reported, and between 
eight and eleven member states representing between 102 and 179 votes (out of 321) voted in favour (a 
qualified majority was 232) (Council Documents 13183/05; 14565/05; 12628/06).  In the 17 votes in 
the regulatory committee during 2007-09 (when the EU had 27 member sates) between 10 and 16 
member states representing between 141 and 214 votes (out of 345) voted in favour (a qualified 
majority was 255) (Commission documents COM(2007) 346; COM(2007) 403; COM(2007) 402; 
COM(2007) 397; COM(2007) 813; COM(2007) 814; COM(2007) 815; COM(2007) 816; COM(2008) 
47; COM(2008) 218; COM(2008) 226; COM(2008) 678; COM(2008) 669; COM(2009) 444; 
COM(2009) 457; COM(2009) 443; COM(2009) 613). 
21
  Interviews, Commission officials (Brussels, 22, 23 and 24 Feb. 2010). 
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non-decision in the standing committee advancing a proposal to the Council and in the 
wake of the (inevitable) non-decision in the Council approving the crop.  These 
efforts focused on the GM varieties of particular concern to the complainants22 and 
those for which the lack of approvals were presenting problems for EU livestock 
farmers.23  DG Trade’s efforts, however, were more successful with DG SANCO than 
with DG ENV.24 
 
The faltering approval of GM varieties for cultivation 
A significant part of the explanation for the lower number of approvals for cultivation 
than for food and feed is that many fewer varieties have been submitted for approval 
(18 versus 67 by the end of 2009).  As of March 2010 EFSA had issued opinions on 
the cultivation of five GM varieties – maize 1507 (January 2005); Bt11 maize (April 
2005); amflora potato (February 2006); maize NK603 (June 2009); and the renewal of 
maize MON810 (June 2009) – many fewer than the 34 varieties on which EFSA had 
given it opinion with regard to safety.  The interaction of the more sceptical view of 
the Environment Commissioner/DG ENV to biotechnology and greater member state 
government concern about environmental risk assessment, however, also impeded the 
approval of GMOs for cultivation. 
One concern for Commissioner Dimas/DG ENV and for the environment 
ministers of a number of member states was the thoroughness of EFSA’s 
environmental risk assessments (EFSA 2008; 2009; Council 2008: 22).  The two 
varieties of Bt maize (1507 and Bt11) and the Amflora potato were referred back to 
                                                 
22
 Interviews, Commission officials (Brussels, 22 Feb. 2010); European biotechnology industry 
representative (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010). 
23
 Interviews, US government official (Brussels, 24 Feb. 2010); European Commission official 
(Brussels, 23 Feb. 2010); European biotechnology industry representative (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010). 
24
 Interviews, Commission officials (Brussels, 22, 23 and 24 Feb. 2010); European biotechnology 
industry representative (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010). 
  22 
EFSA to address specific concerns.  Such requests for further risk assessments were 
seen by many as DG ENV using its agenda-setting powers to impede approvals.25   
More strikingly, in October 2007 citing evidence about the potential adverse 
impact of Bt maize varieties on non-target species that had come to light subsequent 
to EFSA’s second positive opinion, DG ENV drafted proposals rejecting the maize 
varieties 1507 and Bt11 (ESA 2008; EuropaBio 2007; Riss 2007).26  When these 
proposals were debated by the Commission in May 2008, as part of a wider discussion 
on GMO policy, they were not adopted (ESA 2008; Riss 2007).  Rather, the 
Commission confirmed its confidence in EFSA and indicated its intention to take 
decisions where the EU’s approval procedures require the Commission to act, but it 
agreed to refer the two Bt maize varieties back to EFSA for further consideration 
(Commission 2008).  Thus the Environment Commissioner and DG ENV had tried to 
block approval of two GM varieties, but they were not supported by the Commission 
as a whole.  The outcome, however, was to delay further the adoption of the maize 
varieties for cultivation.   
Moreover, when the member states have considered approvals for cultivation, 
there has been even less support than for approvals for food and feed. When 
SCoFCAH considered maize varieties 1507 and Bt11 on 25 February 2009, for 
instance, only six member states (91 votes) voted in favour of authorisation; 12 (127 
votes) voted against; seven (95 votes) abstained; and two (32 votes) were absent 
(euobersver.com 26 Feb. 2009; International Herald Tribute, 25 Feb. 2009).27 Despite 
the absence of a qualified majority against, however, the Commission has not 
                                                 
25
 Interviews, Commission officials (Brussels 22 and 24 Feb. 2010); COPA-COGECA representative 
(Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010); European biotechnology industry representative (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010). 
26
 The draft proposals are available at:http://www.gmo-safety.eu/pdf/dokumente/draft_1507.pdf; 
http://www.gmo-safety.eu/pdf/dokumente/draft_bt11.pdf  (last accessed 11 March 2010). 
27
 See also http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/stop-the-crop-action/background-information/approval-of-
new-gmos.html. Last accessed 12 March 2010. 
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submitted a proposal for approval to the Council as of March 2010.  The Amflora 
potato was considered by the Council in July 2007, but there was no qualified 
majority for or against approval (Commission 2010a).  The Commission, however, 
did not subsequently approve the GM potato for cultivation.  Rather, it too was 
referred back to EFSA in May 2008.  In June 2009 EFSA confirmed its positive 
opinion, and in March 2010, the Commission approved the Amflora potato.  The 
Commission, therefore, has been less activist with respect to approvals for cultivation. 
Beyond the reticence of DG ENV and Commission Dimas, wider political 
considerations may have contributed to the Commission’s more cautious approach 
with respect to approvals for cultivation.  The term of the Commission was due to 
come to an end on 31 October 2009, and with Commission President Barroso seeking 
a second term, there were strong incentives not to pursue policy initiatives that were 
unpopular with the member states, such as approving the cultivation of GM crops 
supported by only a minority (The Economist, 12 Mar. 2009).28  Strikingly, the 
Commission’s approval of the Amflora potato came after the new Commission took 
office in February 2010 and the reassignment of responsibility for approvals for 
cultivation from DG ENV to DG SANCO (Commission 2009b).  A number of 
observers inside and outside the Commission interpret this reform as intended to deny 
a sceptical DG ENV its agenda-setting power.29 
 
Problematic member state bans 
By contrast to approvals, the Commission has next to no scope to pursue its 
preferences with respect to the member states’ bans because of the strength of 
member state opposition to efforts to lift them.  The Commission has repeatedly 
                                                 
28
 Interviews, Commission officials (Brussels, 22, 24 Feb. 2010). 
29
 Interviews, Commission official (Brussels, 24 Feb. 2010); European biotechnology industry 
representative (Brussels, 25 Feb. 2010); Greenpeace representative (telephone, 2 Mar. 2010). 
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proposed lifting the member states’ bans, but on all but one occasion it was 
overwhelmingly rebuffed.  In June 2005, prior to the WTO panel’s ruling, the 
Commission’s proposals to require the lifting of the eight member state bans – Austria 
(maize T25; maize Bt176; maize MON 810); France (oilseed rape MS1Bn x RF1Bn; 
oilseed rape Topas 19/2); Germany (maize Bt 176); Greece (oilseed rape Topas 19/2); 
Luxembourg (maize Bt 176) – where overwhelming rejected by the member states 
(Council 2005).30  Almost all of these products were subsequently withdrawn from the 
market by their producers rendering the bans moot.31  In 2006 the Commission 
targeted only Austria’s bans on GM maize T25 and MON 810, the only varieties 
affected by member state bans that were still being sold.32  Twenty-one member states 
voted against the proposal (Council 2006) and against a subsequent proposal against 
Hungary’s ban on GM maize MON810 (adopted in 2005) (Council 2007).  In 
rejecting these proposals the Council specified particular concerns about the 
environmental risk assessments of the two products (Council 2006; 2007).   
In response, the Commission proposed requiring that Austria lift its ban on 
only the use and sale of the GM varieites.  At the October 2007 Environment Council 
15 member states voted against the proposal and only four in favour, but the large 
number of abstentions (eight), meant that the proposal was not rejected (Pollack and 
Shaffer 2009: 259).  After considerable internal debate given the strength of member 
state opposition, the Commission in May 2008 informed Austria that it was required 
to lift its bans with respect to sale of the two varieties, which it did.  The 
Commission’s subsequent efforts in early 2009 to lift the cultivation bans of Austria, 
France, Greece and Hungary were all overwhelmingly rejected (Commission 2009a: 
                                                 
30
 The closest of the votes on the eight bans (Austria’s ban on maize MON 810) was 234 votes against, 
54 in favour. 
31
 See http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm. Last accessed 7 August 2010. 
32
 See http://ec.europa.eu/food/dyna/gm_register/index_en.cfm. Last accessed 7 August 2010. 
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4; Council 2009a: 8).  Thus the EU’s win-set with respect to national bans on the 
cultivation of GM crops is very small, and explicit rejection of the Commission’s 
proposals means that it is not able to pursue its policy preferences. 
In the face of such sustained opposition and the proliferation of national bans 
on the cultivation of MON810, in March 2010 the Commission (2010b) indicated its 
intention to advance a proposal to allow the member states more choice in deciding 
whether to allow the cultivation of GM crops.  This idea was first floated by the Dutch 
government in February 2009 (Commission 2009a) and endorsed at the June 2009 
Environment Council by Austria supported by 12 other member states (Council 
2009b).  It was trailed by Commission President Barroso (2009: 39) in his ‘political 
guidelines’ for the Commission taking office in 2010.  In the face of overwhelming 
member state opposition to lifting national bans on cultivation, the Commission seems 
be beating a tactical retreat.   
 
Conclusions 
The development of the transatlantic dispute over GMOs, while quite fraught, has 
been much less conflictual than was widely anticipated at its outset.  The expectations 
of fierce conflict reflected assessments of the strength of societal preferences in the 
two polities.  These expectations thus reflected prevailing international political 
economy accounts of trade disputes and the emerging literature on the domestic 
politics of compliance.  Both of these accounts could explain the less fraught 
development of the dispute if there had been powerful societal mobilization in favour 
of restraint (in the US) and compliance (in the EU), but there is no evidence that this 
occurred significantly in either polity. 
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 This article, however, contends that the less fraught development of the 
dispute and the contours of the EU’s compliance can best be explained by the 
substantive preferences of the two executives and the scope they had to pursue them. 
The Bush administration, for a variety of reasons, was not inclined to challenge the 
EU’s entire regulatory framework for GMOs, as many influential interest groups and 
Congressional leaders wanted.  As it did not need formal ratification of its decision, it 
had considerable autonomy, enhanced by the inter-governmental nature of WTO 
dispute settlement, to pursue its preferred course of action.  This illustrates that 
government preferences can shape the form and substance of a WTO dispute, not just 
whether there is one.  
Given the common perception of the US as highly responsive to business 
interests and the strength of the political pressure for an aggressive challenge to the 
EU’s regulations, the US case is a hard case for the influence of government 
preferences on the conduct of trade disputes.  That the US government did pursue its 
preferences, therefore, suggests that it is crucial to consider government preferences 
when analysing the initiation of trade disputes more generally. 
The European Commission, at least as a collective, was more favourably 
disposed towards GMOs than were the member states.  The WTO ruling against the 
EU’s failure to implement its own policies gave those in the Commission most 
favourably disposed towards biotechnology an extra lever to accelerate approvals for 
marketing.  This was less successful with respect to approvals for cultivation, where a 
sceptical key agenda setter within the Commission was able to impede approvals until 
reforms introduced with the new Commission at the beginning of 2010 negated its 
agenda setting power.  The hostility of an overwhelming majority the member state 
governments to forcing member states to lift their bans, however, means that the EU’s 
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win-set is very constricted and the Commission has next to no scope to pursue its 
preferences.   
 The EU’s response to the adverse WTO ruling on GMOs is hardly a typical 
case of compliance, but it is, nonetheless, instructive.  In some respects it is a 
permissive case in that due to domestic decision rules the Commission has 
considerable policy autonomy, particularly with respect to approvals of GM varieties 
of food and feed.  Nonetheless, the decisiveness of the Commission’s preferences in 
this respect highlights that in at least some cases government preferences might be 
crucial to explaining outcomes.  Moreover, the variance in changes to the EU’s policy 
across the different aspects of the dispute underlines the importance of paying 
attention to the opportunities and constraints on executive action created by domestic 
institutions. 
 This article, therefore, contributes to the literatures on dispute settlement and 
the domestic politics of compliance by highlighting that the substantive preferences of 
an executive can be important in explaining outcomes.  How important will depend on 
how much autonomy the executive has given domestic decision rules.  Further, and 
more implicitly, the article underlines that the decision whether to comply with an 
adverse international ruling takes place within an on-going political process in which 
some actors favour policy change for reasons independent of external pressure.   
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